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The Buddhist doctrine of the two truths differentiates between two levels of truth (Sanskrit: satya) in Buddhist discourse: a "relative" or commonsense truth (Pāli: sammuti sacca), and an "ultimate" or absolute, spiritual truth (Pāli: paramattha sacca). This avoids confusion between doctrinally accurate statements about the true nature of reality (e.g., "there is no self") and practical statements that refer to things which, while not expressing the true nature of reality, are necessary in order to communicate easily and help people achieve enlightenment (e.g., talking to a student about "himself" or "herself").
Stated differently, the two truths doctrine holds that truth exists in conventional and ultimate forms, and that both forms are co-existent. Some schools, such as Dzogchen, hold that the two truths are ultimately resolved into nonduality as a lived experience and are non-different. The doctrine is an especially important element of Buddhism and was first expressed in complete modern form by Nāgārjuna, who based it on the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta.
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The two truths doctrine (Tibetan: bden-pa gnyis):
The Sanskrit term for relative, "samvṛti", also implies false, hidden, concealed, or obstructed, as well as other nuanced concepts. Translator Jules Levinson interprets the conventional truth as "obscurative truth" or "that which obscures the true nature" as a result.[1]
Berzin (2007) highlights the centrality of the two truths doctrine to Buddhism:
All Hinayana and Mahayana tenet systems assert the two truths (bden-pa gnyis). Regardless of how the tenet systems define and delineate them, the two truths always constitute a dichotomy (dngos-‘gal). All knowable phenomena must be members of the set of either one or the other true phenomena, with nothing knowable that belongs to either both or neither of the sets. Consequently, understanding the two truths constitutes understanding [the nature of] all knowable phenomena.[2]
While this division, particularly when referred to as the "satya-dvaya", is often associated with the Madhyamaka school, its history is quite extensive. Casual readers of Buddhist thought have often used the ideas of the two truths to erroneously identify Buddhism as being transcendental in nature, and thereby identify its doctrines with Plato or Kant.
In Buddhism, it is applied particularly to the doctrine of emptiness, in which objects are ultimately empty of essence, yet conventionally appear the contrary at any given moment in time, such that they neither exist nor do not exist.
In the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta, the Buddha, speaking to the monk Kaccayana Gotta on the topic of right view, says the following:
By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one.[3]
Two pairs of terms are used in the Pāli Tipiṭaka. One pair is nītattha (Pāli; Sanskrit: nītārtha, "of plain or clear meaning")[4] and neyyattha (Pāli; Sanskrit: neyartha, "[a word or sentence] having a sense that can only be guessed")[5]. These terms were used to identify texts or statements that either did (as neyartha) or did not (as nītattha) require additional interpretation in order to be made clear and/or non-contradictory and/or doctrinally accurate in a strict sense. A nītattha text required no explanation, while a neyyattha one might mislead some people unless properly explained.[6]
The other pair is saṃmuti or samuti (Pāli; Sanskrit: saṃvṛti; the Pāli and Sanskrit both mean "common consent, general opinion, convention",)[8] and paramattha (Pāli; Sanskrit: paramārtha, "ultimate"). These are used to distinguish conventional or common-sense language, as used in metaphors or for the sake of convenience, from language used to express higher truths directly.
The term vohāra (Pāli; Sanskrit: vyavahāra, "common practice, convention, custom" is also used in more or less the same sense as samuti.
In the canon, the distinction is not made between a lower truth and a higher truth, but rather between two kinds of expressions of the same truth, which must be interpreted differently. Thus a phrase or passage, or a whole sutta, might be classed as neyyattha or samuti or vohāra, but it is not regarded at this stage as expressing or conveying a different level of truth.
There is a canonical assertion that "truth is one". That might be held to conflict with a systematic assertion that there is a bifold distinction of truths.[9]
The Theravādin commentators expanded on these categories and began applying them not only to expressions but to the truth then expressed.
The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events.[10]
The Prajnāptivāda school took up the distinction between the conventional and ultimate (paramārtha/saṃvṛti), and extended the concept to metaphysical-phenomenological constituents (dharmas), distinguishing those that are real (tattva) from those that are purely conceptual, i.e., ultimately nonexistent (prajnāpti).
The two truths are central to many Mahāyāna texts. In Yogācāra texts you may alternatively find discussions of the three natures.
Some presentations distinguish not only which teachings are classified as relating to the relative truth or ultimate truth, but also which kinds of knowledge or methods are for accomplishing each. In his introduction to his translation of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, D.T.Suzuki writes the following:
Without a theory of cognition, therefore, Mahayana philosophy becomes incomprehensible. The Lanka is quite explicit in assuming two forms of knowledge: the one for grasping the absolute or entering into the realm of Mind-only, and the other for understanding existence in its dualistic aspect in which logic prevails and the Vijnanas are active. The latter is designated Discrimination (vikalpa) in the Lanka and the former transcendental wisdom or knowledge (prajna). To distinguish these two forms of knowledge is most essential in Buddhist philosophy.
Within the Mahāyāna presentation, the two truths may also refer to specific perceived phenomena instead of categorizing teachings. Conventional truths would be the appearances of mistaken awareness - the awareness itself when mistaken - together with the objects that appear to it. To put it another way, a conventional truth would be the appearance that includes a duality of apprehender and apprehended and objects perceived within that. Ultimate truths, then, are phenomena free from the duality of apprehender and apprehended.[1]
The distinction between the two truths (satyadvayavibhāga) is of great importance for the Madhyamaka school, as it forms a cornerstone of their beliefs; in Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, for example, it is used to defend the identification of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) with emptiness (śūnyatā).
The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved.—Nagarjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārika 24:8-10[11]
Within the Madhyamālaṃkāra (8th century) of Śāntarakṣita (725–788) is enshrined the epitome of Indian Buddhism prior to its decline in the land of its origin.[12] Śāntarakṣita was a khenpo of Nālandā University in India, a position he surrendered to became a Khenpo of Samye in Tibet at the behest of King Trisong Deutsen.[13]
Ju Mipham (1846–1912) in his commentary to the Madhyamālaṃkāra says:[14]
If one trains for a long time in the union of the two truths, the stage of acceptance (on the path of joining), which is attuned to primordial wisdom, will arise. By thus acquiring a certain conviction in that which surpasses intellectual knowledge, and by training in it, one will eventually actualize it. This is precisely how the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas have said that liberation is to be gained.[15]
In this quotation, "primordial wisdom" is a rendering of jñāna and "that which surpasses intellectual knowledge" may be understood as the direct perception (Sanskrit: pratyakṣa) of suchness (dharmatā). "Conviction" may be understood as a gloss of faith (śraddhā). An effective analogue for "union", a rendering of the relationship held by the two truths, is interpenetration.
The following sentence is from Mipham's famed exegesis of Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamālaṃkāra and it highlights the relationship between the absence of the four extremes (mtha'-bzhi) and the nondual or "indivisible two truths" (bden-pa dbyer-med). This is a first English rendering by Doctor (2004: p.127). The Wylie transcription following it is from Doctor (2004: p.126). Then follows a second English translation of the same passage by Blankleder and Fletcher of the Padmakara Translation Group (2005: p.137):
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McEvilley (2002) presents a case for mutual iteration and pervasion of Pyrrhonism and Madhyamika doctrines. In the following extract containing an open quotation[19] of Sextus, which broaches upon paraphrase, McEvilley (2002: p.474) frames a commonality shared by the two traditions, being a pedagogical binary division of a truth (esoterically held to be indivisible):
The relation between absolute and relative being necessarily involves the doctrine of the double truth, another central theme shared by Pyrrhonists and Madhyamikas, Sextus says (OP† II.14-18, AP‡ VII.29-35, and elsewhere) that there are two criteria: that by which we judge reality and unreality, and that which we use as a guide in everyday life. According to the first criterion, nothing is either true or false, inductive statements based on direct observation of phenomena may be treated as either true or false for the purpose of making everyday practical decisions. The distinction, as Conze♦ has noted, is equivalent to the Madhyamika distinction between "Absolute truth" (paramārthasatya), "the knowledge of the real as it is without any distortion,"¡ and "Truth so-called" (saṃvṛti satya), "truth as conventionally believed in common parlance."¿[20]
♦ = Conze (1959: pp.140-141)
† = Sextus Empericus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism
‡ = Anthologia Palatina (Palatine Anthology)
¡ = Conze (1959: p.244)
¿ = Conze (1959: p.244)
Works related to Saṃyukta Āgama 301: Kātyāyana Gotra Sūtra at Wikisource